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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the performance of leveraged buyout 
acquisitions and investments (LBOs) backed and exited by Finnish private equity 
firms. Specifically, the study focuses on value creation of leveraged buyouts and 
improvements in operating performance of the target companies.   
The thesis concentrates on the latest evidence from LBOs, while literature and 
studies from previous decades cannot be sided. In this thesis, the evidence of 
leveraged buyout value creation has been reviewed by using earlier research and 
literature. Due to a lack of studies contributed on Finnish LBO transactions 
considering value creation and operational performance, the study uses theory from 
European and U.S. buyouts. Improvements in operational performance and value 
creation in funds have been investigated by using earlier studies and by conducting 
empirical study about the effects of leveraged buyout investments to portfolio 
company´s operational performance and value creation to portfolio investors.  
Overall, it can be concluded that private equity firms are often able to improve 
portfolio company´s operating performance, while sometimes improvements remain 
smaller, partly due to the situation in the debt markets. Previous empirical findings 
provide controversial results from performance of the private equity fund 
investments compared to public investments. Findings suggest that, private equity 
fund is often able to create similar returns to investors than public counterparts. One 
explanation for these mixed results could be the fee structure of the private equity 
fund. There is large gap between gross-of-fees and net-of-fees returns.  
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Is success in buyouts more depending on choosing the right horse, while emphases 
on the rider are being brushed away? Leveraged buyouts, also known as LBOs, are 
relatively new and have been a significant element in the area of mergers and 
acquisitions over the last three decades. Value creation in LBO investments can be 
divided into two different sources: improvements in company´s operational 
performance and leverage benefits that cause tax shield and improvements in 
management incentives. Despite improvements made to buyout companies, private 
equity firms are time to time accused of over levering their portfolios. Situation in 
the debt markets has significant affect on LBOs and therefore, the leverage in LBO 
investments has varied a lot over the time due to changes in economy factors. 
Previous empirical literature regarding LBOs suggests that these investments cause 
higher corporate performance. These improvements in corporate performance are 
caused by managerial discipline, increased use of leverage and better managerial 
incentives.     
Achleitner et al. (2011) points out that there is still a lack of research that 
investigates mechanisms of value creation in buyout targets and private equity 
returns. When concerning returns of private equity, the difference between return on 
enterprise value (EV) and return on equity value, must be considered. In addition, 
there is a need for more research about entry and exit pricing in private equity 
markets. There are plenty of unanswered questions regarding private equity. Does 
pricing explain private equity company`s abnormal returns? For now that question 
remains unanswered, while there is a large consensus that ex post EBITDA multiple 
expansion is one of the key value drivers explaining returns of private equity. Entry 
and exit pricing is interesting when considering the illiquidity and diverse 
information asymmetries between different parties, and therefore, an understanding 
of determinants for entry and exit pricing in buyouts is important (Achleitner et al. 
2011: 146-148).  
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Wright et al. (1994) defines a buyout as the purchase of a major stake in a company 
for a certain time using usually both equity and debt. (Wright et al., 1994a: 216.) In 
a leveraged buyout transaction, an investment firm (private equity firm) acquires a 
company by using only a small amount of own equity and a large amount of outside 
debt to finance the acquisition. Leveraged buyouts first emerged as widely known 
phenomena in the 1980s when the number of corporate mergers and acquisitions 
increased rapidly. Mergers and acquisitions were already common before the 1980s 
but the size of the mergers was increasing rapidly. Since 1980s private equity has 
received more attention amongst academic researchers and investors. Leveraged 
buyouts became an important tool of acquisitions and takeovers partly due to an 
easier access to debt markets. In 2007, U.S. private equity assets were almost 200 
billion dollars and the growth has been considerable since then. Before the subprime 
crisis (2006-2007), a record amount of capital was committed to private equity 
industry, but crisis and turmoil in the debt markets declined the amount of capital 
committed to private equity (see figure 1. and 2.) (Pignantaro 2014: xi) (Kaplan & 
Strömberg 2009:121-125).  
Global Private Equity Transaction Volume 1985-2006 
 
Figure 1: Global private equity transaction volume 1985-2006 (Kaplan & 
Strömberg 2009: 126) 
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LBO Loan Volume Since 1997 
 
Figure 2: LBO loan volume since 1997 (Cross, 2013) 
 
Financial crisis in 2008 raised questions regarding the role of the private equity and 
the effects of private equity buyouts, which are by far the largest investments of the 
private equity industry (Wilson, Wright, Siegel & Scholes 2012). 
Private equity firms often use significant amounts of debt to finance their buyouts 
and therefore they have to use only a small amount of their own equity. Despite 
controversial reputation, private equity has become an important strategic way to 
allocate assets in the portfolios of institutional investors, pension funds and wealthy 
individuals. (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009:123-124).  
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1.1 Objective and Research Questions 
Private equity has come an important strategic part of portfolios of insurance 
companies, pension fund, bank and wealthy individuals. Leveraged buyout 
companies or private equity firms finance their buyouts using 60 to 90 per cent debt. 
Previously banks invested in these loans, but at this date investors are mainly 
institutional.  (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009: 124). Due to a large growth of this asset 
class, many investors believe that private equity is able to create really high returns 
and outperform public counterparts. (Phalippou & Gottschalg 2009: 1747). 
According to Cressy et al. (2007) and Kaplan (1989), it is widely believed that 
leveraged buyouts have created value to investee companies by improving 
performance and profitability more than their public counterparts. Nevertheless, the 
evidence from leveraged buyouts and private equity’s profitability is not completely 
clear, as there is also academic evidence that privately owned companies have 
underperformed (in terms of operational performance) in comparison to their 
industry`s public counterparts.    
The main goal of this study is to examine the value creation and operating 
performance of leveraged buyout investments from a perspective of a private equity 
firm. The study provides an answer to the following question: how does the 
involvement of a private equity firm impact the operating performance and value of 
firms undergoing a leveraged buyout? This study investigates whether private 
equity firms are able to create abnormal returns by leveraged buyouts and 
improvements in the operating performance of investee companies.   
First hypothesis of the thesis is focuses on relationship between private equity firm 
and the target company. Furthermore the first hypothesis of thesis is that there is a 
positive relationship between private equity ownership and the operating 
performance of the target company during the holding period of the sponsor. Also 
study investigates the relationship of the sales growth and enterprise value of the 
target company. Therefore the second hypothesis of the thesis is that leveraged 
buyout transactions with higher sales growth during the holding period yield a 
higher enterprise value. 
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into four main chapters. The first main section defines and 
introduces the private equity industry and leveraged buyouts. Furthermore, main 
characteristics and backgrounds of both are demonstrated. Thus, the section defines, 
what is private equity financing, what are private equity funds and what are the risks 
and opportunities of private equity. In addition, chapter introduces leveraged buyout 
investments.  
The determinants of leveraged buyout investments are presented in the second main 
section. This chapter focuses on the estimates of value creation and introduces the 
main sources of value creation in leveraged buyout investments. This part of the 
thesis review the methodologies used in study to define value creation in buyouts by 
estimating private equity firm´s ability to improve portfolio company´s and value 
creation in private equity funds.  
Evidence of value creation in leveraged buyout investments is presented in the third 
part. This section is divided into two parts: LBOs ability to create improvements to 
portfolio company´s operational performance and LBO funds ability to create 
returns to fund investors. Evidence is collected from earlier literature about LBOs. 
Section of this provides answers to these stated research questions and presents 
whether private equity firms are able to improve portfolio company´s operational 
performance and whether private equity funds are able to create abnormal returns 
by using LBOs. Fourth chapter of the thesis introduces the data that is being used to 
produce empirical results of the study. Furthermore, the next chapter shows the 
empirical results of the study. The Last section of this thesis then concludes the 
results.   
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2. PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY 
 
2.1 Private Equity Financing 
 
The private equity market has become an important source of funds for young start-
up firms, private middle-market firms, firms in financial distress, and public firms 
seeking buyout financing. While private equity has been a fastest growing market 
for corporate finance, it has received relatively little attention in the press. (Fenn et 
al. 1997: 1).    
As stated above, the main issue concerning private equity research is the amount of 
data available. Due to the fact that private equity companies are not publicly traded, 
they do not have to follow the same disclosure requirements as their public 
counterparts. There are also differences concerning the publicity of accounting 
statements among private equity companies, as European private equity companies 
are required to deliver accounting statements to public domain while U.S private 
equity companies do not. (Jenkinson & Sousa 2014: 401).  
There are two main types of private equity investments: venture capital investments 
and leveraged buyouts. Venture capital investments focus mainly on early stages of 
companies and they are often used to fund product development and research.  
Venture capital investments concentrate to help a company in launch, development 
and expansion. The buyout is the only type of private equity investments that 
contains debt. Therefore it is a mistake to think that all private equity firms use 
leverage as a tool (Frasier-Sampson 2011: 2-13) (Cendrowski et al. 2008: 19-20). 
Unlike venture capital deals, leveraged buyouts focus more on mature and public 
companies that want to expand their market share. Leveraged buyouts often include 
a large amount of debt as it is assumed that a higher debt-to-equity ratio causes a 
higher return on equity for equity holders. According to Kaplan & Strömberg 
(2008), in a typical transaction, the private equity company buys another company 
with a premium of 15-50% over the current stock price. These transactions or 
buyouts are often financed with large amounts of debt and therefore referred as 
leveraged buyouts. The value of U.S. private equity transactions compared to U.S. 
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stock market value increased rapidly between 2000-2007. (Cendrowski et al. 2008: 
21-22)(Kaplan & Strömberg 2008: 124-125).  
According to Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) private equity firms are typically 
arranged as a certain kind of partnership or limited liability corporation. Jensen 
(1989) mentions that professional investors including famous LBO partnerships like 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Clayton & Dubalier (including legendary investor 
Warren Buffet) were among the first to build a new model of general management, 
which became the most used management model of private equity industry. 
Characteristics for this business model are pay-for-performance compensation 
system, high leverage level, value maximization and large equity ownership by 
management team. Thus these organizations are able to motivate people, resources 
and perform more effectively than in public corporate form due to a lack of conflict 
problems between the management and owners. (Jensen 1989: 7).   
According to Axelson et al. (2009), transaction types in private equity can be 
divided in three categories. In the first category private equity fund tries to find a 
target and work on an exclusive basis with the vendor. In the second category 
different private equity companies compete in an auction to purchase a company. In 
the third category the private equity firm tries to take over a publicly quoted 
company. In these public-to-private deals shareholders ultimately decide whether 
they accept deal or not. (Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg & Weisbach 2009: 8)   
 
2.2 Private Equity Funds 
 
Private equity market connects talented managers and institutional investors when 
both benefit from new partnership. This private equity partnership or private equity 
fund can be seen as a connector of highly talented managers and capital providers 
and therefore as a really powerful investment machine. Through a private equity 
fund, a private equity firm is able to raise equity capital. General partners (GPs) are 
responsible for managing the fund and handle investments to portfolio/investee 
companies while limited partners (LPs) provide the most of the capital. LPs are 
typically institutional investors or wealthy individuals, while a private equity firm 
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usually works as a GP. GPs often provide their share of the capital to the fund first. 
After providing the capital, LPs are not able to affect to GPs investments decisions 
while GPs must follow the fund agreements, which often include different sorts of 
restrictions. Thus there are often limits on how large capital portion can be invested 
into one company, what assets a fund can invest in and how high the leverage ratio 
can be. Private equity funds’ final goal is to realize value increase in portfolio 
companies. There are three ways for GPs to earn compensations through funds. GPs 
earn management fees, which are usually a certain percentage of committed capital. 
Thus GPs also earn a carried interest, which is often roughly 20% and deal charges 
and monitoring fees of investee companies (Kaplan & Strömberg 2008: 124). 
 
The Private Equity Business Model 
Institutional-
investors 
 Fund of Funds  Private 
individuals 
 Corporates  Others 
 
       €                            €                         €                          €                      € 
 
Private equity investment fund 
                                                                                €  
 
Figure 3. The private equity business model (EVCA 2007) 
Private equity 
management 
company 
(advises)  
Investee/Portfolio 
company 
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2.3 Risks and Opportunities of Private Equity 
 
While private equity fund seems to be an optimal investment opportunity with 
highest possible returns, there are different uncertainties and risks due to the nature 
of these investments. Zhu et al. (2004) divides risks of portfolio into six different 
categories. These risks are bankruptcy risk, liquidity risk, reinvestment risk, 
partnership/management risk, historical data risk and tax management risk. 
Bankruptcy risk means that there is a risk that a portfolio company runs out of 
money. If a portfolio company has not invested heavily on tangible assets, there is a 
possibility that financiers are not able to recover much of their investments. Thus 
the illiquidity is the main risk for investors concerning investments to private equity 
funds (Emery 2003: 47). Kaserer and Diller (2005) point out that there are no 
secondary markets for private equity fund investments. Thus trading with LPs 
investments is not possible during the fund’s lifetime and therefore investors must 
hold their capital in the fund in question until their exit.  (Kaserer & Diller 2005: 
112). Nonetheless, there is one opportunity for LPs to liquidate committed capital 
before the end of a fund. In a “secondary buyout” a private equity firm buys stakes 
of the portfolio company of another private equity firm. These secondary buyouts 
have developed substantially and they should decrease the level of illiquidity of the 
asset class (Diller & Kaserer 2009: 645). Due to limited investment opportunities, 
private equity firms are not able to invest distributions from private equity fund to 
fund and therefore distributions are not able to generate similar returns to original 
investment. Thus there might be different conflicts between GPs and LPs. For 
example, GPs might take too much risk in investments to get higher returns due to a 
small amount of committed capital. Historical data risk refers to a limited amount of 
data and information about previous business performance of the portfolio 
companies. Tax management problems occur if private equity cannot smooth out 
this tax liability over the life of the investment. (Zhu et al. 2004: 32). On the other 
hand, private equity is an attractive possibility for the asset allocation. A private 
equity firm aims to maximize the performance of the portfolio company, while there 
are also other reasons to invest in private equity. For example, investing in private 
equity might stimulate local economy (Lerner et al. 2007: 755).       
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2.5 Private Equity in Finland 
 
Finnish private equity funds raised 532 million euros in 2016 at which 114 million 
was raised for venture capital funds and 418 million for buyout funds. Investors 
were for example pensions companies, state investing companies, family offices, 
insurance companies and private investors. Furthermore, foreign investments tripled 
compared to 2015. More than 100 million came from international investors. Thus, 
there are 30 members at the Finnish Venture Capital Association that focus on 
buyout transactions. According to FVCA, the average buyout investment in Finland 
is about 4.7 million euros. (FVCA) 
 
2.5 Leveraged buyouts 
In a leveraged buyout, a company is acquired by an investment firm, (private equity 
firm), using a small amount of own equity and significant amount of outside debt to 
finance the acquisition. Private equity firms and investment banks use leveraged 
buyouts. In a buyout transaction, the investment firm usually buys a majority 
control of a company.  
In the 1980s, leveraged buyouts became more common, partly because it was easier 
for buyers to borrow more money. Leverage buyouts of public companies were 
relatively rare during the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000-century, but in the 
mid-2000s these transactions reappeared (Second leveraged buyout boom, Kaplan 
& Strömberg 2009: 122). If a company is able to borrow more money, it needs less 
own equity to finance the acquisition. The leveraged buyout model is also used in 
investment banking.  
Successful leverage buyouts consist of three elements: cash availability (interest, 
debt pay-down), operation improvements and multiple expansions. A private equity 
firm has to calculate optimal exit opportunities. Private equity firms try to benefit 
from the cash flow of the acquired company. Cash flow is used to pay down debt 
and interest and therefore by the time debt will transfer into equity value.  
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After the buyout, a private equity firm tries to make improvements to the 
company´s operating performance and make business more efficient. Improvement 
in operating performance should increase cash flow and consequently, the overall 
value of the business.  Increase in overall business value means that business can be 
sold at a higher price. Investors, funds and companies have expertise in different 
industries and are thus more able to improve certain parts of the business. Generally 
speaking, the private equity firm´s aim is always to improve the overall value of the 
acquired company.  
Multiple expansion means that an overall value of the company will increase. 
Multiples are set for the purchase and exits of the target company. Returns from 
buyouts are realized when the business is sold. There are different ways to exit a 
buyout: strategic sale, financial sponsor, initial public offering and dividend 
recapitalization. Strategic sale means that a company can be sold to a strategic 
buyer who finds strategic benefits to owning the business. Financial sponsor often 
means another private equity firm that has a different focus. Initial public offering 
(IPO) means that a company can be sold to the public markets. In a dividend 
recapitalization a company receives liquidity from business investments.  
(Pignantaro 2014: 1-4)  
 
2.5.1 Different types of buyouts 
 
Leveraged buyout deal process includes many different theories and concepts thus 
these interact differently with each other. The main concept is the leveraged buyout 
(LBO), which can be defined as a buyout transaction that is financed with using a 
significant amount debt and a small portion of own equity. Almost all transactions 
are financed through debt and hence they are named as LBOs. LBOs can be divided 
into three different subcategories. These buyout types are management buyouts 
(MBO), management buy-ins (MBI) and institutional buyouts (IBO) (Talmor & 
Vasvari 2011: 275). LBO is called a management buyout (MBO), if the incumbent 
management team (backed by PE investors) leads the transaction. On the other hand 
if there is an outside management team that acquires the company it is referred as a 
management buy in (MBI). MBOs and MBIs differ in terms of information levels as 
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the incumbent management team has more private information about the company. 
MBIs often happen if the incumbent management is not able to realize the full 
potential of the company and therefore these transactions are more often hostile. If 
the new owners of the acquired company are entirely institutional, the transaction is 
referred to be an institutional buyout (IBO). Renneboog & Simons (2005) describes 
differences between MBOs and IBOs: “In terms of equity ownership, what 
separates MBOs from IBOs is whether the management team gained its equity 
interest through being part of the bidding group (in case of an MBO) or as a 
component of a remuneration package (in case of an IBO). As the incumbent 
management in an IBO does not negotiate on behalf of the bidding group, IBOs do 
not spark same controversy as MBOs”. (Renneboog & Simos 2005: 3).         
 
2.5.2 LBO transaction process 
 
Talmor & Varvari (2011) describes the LBO analysis: “ The analysis of LBOs 
requires knowledge of many concepts, theories and instruments. For example, 
knowledge of the different debt and equity instruments as well as ways to determine 
the debt capacity of a company is needed to understand the capital structure of 
buyouts.” Thus LBO financing includes a large amount of assumptions and 
decisions that correlate with each other in very different ways. Typical LBO 
transaction process consists of five different phases that are used in LBOs 
execution. These phases are: (1) Screening of deal opportunities, (2) due diligence, 
(3) acquisition of the target, (4) active ownership and management and (5) exit of 
the target.   
First stage in LBO deal transaction process is the screening of deal opportunities, 
which includes searching and screening different opportunities and possible deals. 
GPs in private equity firm are typically in charge of sourcing potential deals and 
there they use their personal networks that include different sorts of experts, CEOs 
and investment bankers. After sourcing, the initial screening (based on available 
information from the company) is conducted in order to crop deal opportunities. 
Usually a potential LBO target is able to work under a high leverage, potential exit 
opportunity is within 5-to-10-years and should be able to generate 20% IRR. 
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Furthermore, searching and choosing LBO target companies is perhaps the most 
important job of private equity firms. Talmor & Vasvari (2011) name seven 
important characteristics for LBO target: (1) Low current leverage, (2) predictable 
and strong cash flows, (3) strong asset base, (4) operational improvement 
opportunities, (5) growth opportunities, (6) exit opportunities and (7) availability of 
a strong management team. Other considerations concerning LBO targets include 
size of the company, ownership structure, geography and industry.  
Second stage of deal process includes due diligence and negotiation. Due diligence 
means an investigation of a business being acquired. Due diligence is an important 
process where all possible aspects of the acquired company are estimated and 
evaluated. Thus, the meaning of due diligence is to understand the structure of the 
company and what are the possible risks that may occur with investment. Most 
firms hire consultants to complete the due diligence, while sometimes private equity 
firms have expertise to handle some parts of the due diligence process. Due 
diligence process takes often 2-6 moths, while sometimes process is being done 
faster due to time pressure. Furthermore, the due diligence process can be divided 
into four different stages: (1) Strategic due diligence, (2) operational due diligence, 
(3) financial and accounting due diligence and (4) legal due diligence.   
In acquisition of the target, private equity firm must be able to structure financing 
as well as possible in order to get highest possible returns. Therefore right price is 
one of the key factors when acquiring a company. Buyout must be able to generate 
returns to fund and investors, but at the same time, price must be higher than 
competitors offers. Acquisition phase and process is different in different types of 
deals. Private equity firms create LBO models to help in deal structuring and to get 
information and data that price for each acquisition is optimal.  
Active ownership and management of the target is one of the key value drivers in 
leveraged buyouts. Active ownership can be divided in six different substages: (1) 
Defining the full potential of the firm, (2) develop the blueprint of the company, (3) 
accelerate performance, (4) harness the talent, (5) make equity sweat and (6) result-
oriented mindset, which refers to management incentives.  
Exit is the last stage in buyout transaction process. Usually the holding period of the 
buyout company is relatively short and varies between three and seven years due to 
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the fact that success of a fund depends on the internal rate of return (IRR) of the 
investment. When considering an exit, a private equity firm detects current and 
future market conditions, growth potential of the buyout company, and additional 
investment opportunities. Private equity firms aim to generate increase in EBITDA, 
use cash flows to pay debt and generate higher exit multiple before exiting from 
investment (Talmor & Vasvari 2011: 258-269).              
 
 
LBO transaction process 
Figure 4. LBO transaction process (Talmor & Vasvari 2011: 276)  
 
  
2.4.3 Capital structure of LBOs 
 
LBOs often have different debt structures due to the nature of the target, different 
market conditions and investors. Usually LBO transaction contains 50-70% debt 
and 30-50% equity. High leverage increases in returns, while it also causes higher 
financial distress costs. Thus, the debt consists from different instruments, which 
include different risk levels and return possibilities (See table x). Senior instruments 
Screening of 
deal 
opportunities 
Due 
diligence 
Acquisition 
of the 
target 
Active 
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and 
manageme
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Exiting the 
target  
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face lower risks and therefore an interest rate and payments are lower. These 
instruments are typically responsible for 25-50% of the whole amount needed to 
finance the acquisition and consist of bank loans and corporate bonds. Investment 
banks are strongly involved in terms of issuing loans to these investments. Senior 
debt contains stricter covenants, which causes pressure to the buyout company to 
maintain certain credit situation in terms of leverage ratio, interest service coverage 
ratio and debt service coverage ratio. Thus these covenants may limit the flexibility 
of the buyout company. In contrast, junior debt instruments allow higher operational 
flexibility for the target companies, but are also more expensive. This Mezzanine 
financing is a deal between private equity firm and mezzanine providers and it can 
be modified to meet both parties’ interests. Mezzanine financing typically covers 0-
10% of the funds needed. Equity provided in LBO transactions varies due to 
changes in the debt markets. In accordance, private equity firms may form 
consortiums for large LBO transactions. These deals are known as club deals and 
their purpose is to decrease the equity commitment of each private equity firm.         
 
LBO Capital Structure 
 
Table 1: Example of an LBO capital structure (Talmor & Vasvari 2011: 263). 
 
  
23 
3. DETERMINANTS OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS VALUE 
CREATION      
  
3.1 Estimates of value creation 
 
Estimates of buyout value creation are determined from the point of equity investor 
in an equity fund based on value in the acquired company over the investment 
period. The equity value of acquired company can be divided into four different 
determinants: valuation multiple, revenues, margin and net debt.  
Equity Value = Valuation Multiple * Revenues * Margin – Net Debt  
Valuation multiple = EV/ EBITDA 
Revenues = Company`s sales 
Margin = EBITDA/ Sales 
Net Debt = Long term debt + Short term debt – cash and marketable securities 
 
The first determinant of value generation driver is the valuation multiple, which is 
often considered to be the ratio of enterprise value and the EBITDA figure. 
Enterprise value is calculated as a sum of the value equity and net debt at the time 
of the buyout. (Berg & Gottschalg 2015: 7) 
(2) Enterprise value = Equity + Net debt 
 
EBITDA refers to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization and 
it is used as a measure for estimating the operational performance and earning 
potential of the potential company (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009: 138). According to 
Berg & Gottschalg this determinant has no impact on the financial performance of 
the acquired company because changes in the multiple are not correlated with the 
financial performance of the company. Generation of value creation through 
valuation multiple is due to changes in the other market factors, such as private 
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information, different expectations regarding the financial performance and 
industries and other factors that affect on the markets.  
The second determinant is related to revenue growth, margin improvements and net 
debt of the acquired company. These three factors can improve the financial 
performance of the acquired company and in addition these have affect on the 
operational performance of the company. Improvements in financial performance of 
the acquired company are often due to improvements in operating performance 
through revenue growth or/and margin improvements. In addition, the company can 
optimize its cost structure in order to reduce costs of capital. Optimizing the 
company´s cost structure does not always lead to financial improvements as debt 
and equity portions have no direct effect on the value of the company. 
Improvements in these factors mentioned above will ultimately lead to greater 
equity value of the company. (Berg & Gottschlag 2005:12) 
Combining the equations (1) and (2), it is possible to form an equation (3) that helps 
to determine the enterprise value. The equation can be shown as: 
(3) Enterprise value = Equity value + Net debt = Valuation multiple * EBITDA 
Therefore value creation must be due changes in some component of equity value 
which are valuation multiple, revenues, margin and net debt.   
 
Berg & Gottschalg divide the conceptual framework of buyout value creation into 
three different dimensions. The dimension one is about phases of buyout value 
generation. There are three phases in a buyout process; acquisition phase, holding 
phase and divestments phase. Second one is about causes of buyout generation. 
Value creation is often analyzed from the point of an equity investor. Third tells the 
sources of buyout value generation. Buyout value generation can depend on the 
characteristics of the investor involved. Value generation is then often created by 
improvements in operating performance and it can be achieved by expertise of an 
equity investor. (Berg & Gottschalg 2015: 5-10) 
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3.2 Sources of value creation 
 
According to Kaplan & Strömberg (2009), sources of leveraged buyout value 
creation can be divided into three different dimensions; financial, governance and 
operational engineering. These levers are used in investee/portfolio companies in 
order to improve buyout companies’ overall value. Value creation drivers are 
closely related to sources of value creation and therefore to financial engineering, 
governance engineering and operational engineering. Value creation drivers create 
value within these classes.  
Loos et al. (2007) divided value creation drivers into three lower categories; direct 
drivers of value creation effect directly to free cash flow generation of the acquired 
company by cost reductions, asset utilization, growth generation and financial 
engineering. These drivers improve the financial performance and therefore create 
value to private equity firms` portfolio companies. Indirect drivers amplify the 
positive attributes of direct drivers. These drivers are related to changes in 
organization, corporate governance, ownership structure and use of leverage in 
buyouts. In addition to direct and indirect drivers of value creation, there are also 
other sources of value creation, which are related to information asymmetries and 
market inefficiency around buyouts and acquisition and negotiation skills in 
buyouts (Loos et al. 2007: 21-34).  
  
3.2.1 Financial engineering 
 
According to Jensen (1988), the value of the company is maximized when debt and 
equity ratio is optimal and marginal benefits and marginal costs are equal (Jensen 
1988: 30). Private equity firms use financial leverage in order to create value to 
their investee companies. According to Guo et al. (2011) there is a positive 
correlation between the debt financing and cost structure of the investee/portfolio 
company. Companies are able to lower their WACC (Weighted average cost of 
capital) and increase valuation multiple by taking large amounts of cheap debt (Guo 
et al. 2011: 513).  
  
26 
Another important source of value creation in LBO´s is tax shield. In leverage 
financing the interest payment is tax deductible. This view is valid only until the 
debt cost is lower than the advantage from the tax shield. If the amount of leverage 
is too large, the debt costs can exceed the benefits and lead to lower returns and 
value. (Talmor & Vasvari: 293).  
Guo et al. (2011) contains information about the benefits of increased debt to 
operating performance of the portfolio company. Study argues that tax benefits 
from larger leverage account for 33,8 of the sample returns to pre-buyout capital 
(Guo 2011: 508-509). These results and studies support theory that larger realized 
tax benefits due to leverage create larger returns for private equity companies.   
Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) suggests that certain controlled amount of debt also 
controls the portfolio company´s management. Because of interests and regular 
payments, the management is not able to use more money than they should, and 
therefore it is easier to control the free cash flow of the company. Private equity 
firms also pay attention management incentives in investee companies by giving 
upside possibilities for the management through stocks and options. Firms often 
demand the management of the portfolio company to make investment in the 
company so that there is also possibility for downside risk. These investments 
cannot be liquidated because companies are now private and value becomes liquid 
only in exits. Therefore the purpose of these management´s investments is to lower 
the risk of short-term manipulation and reduce agency problems. Management 
incentives are connected also connected to governance engineering. (Kaplan & 
Strömberg 2009: 131).  
 
3.2.2 Governance engineering 
 
Governance engineering is another important source of value creation in LBOs. 
When a private equity company acquires a company, it often makes improvements 
in the buyout company`s governance. With improved corporate governance, a 
private equity company tries to lower its agency costs. In practice governance 
engineering means that a private equity firm is controlling an investee company´s 
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board and are more active in corporate governance than boards in companies 
operating in public markets (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009: 131)  
According to Acharya and Kehoe (2008), private equity boards do not hesitate to 
replace the management if needed and about 33% of chief executive officers are 
fired within 100 days period after buyout and 66% are replaced during first four 
years (Acharya & Kehoe 2008: Page?). Berg & Gottschalg (2005) argues that 
private equity firms try to hire managers with pay-to-performance system in order 
to attract most talented managers in the markets (Berg & Gottschalg 2005: 29).  
Kaplan & Stein (1992) founds that there are positive changes in median percentage 
between pre-buyout and post-buyout equity when the post buyout management 
owns equity. Before the buyout, the new management owns about 5% of the equity 
and after the buyout the median management equity of the company is 22,3%. 
Kaplan & Stein also provides a ratio of the percentage of post- to pre-buyout equity 
owned by the management team. This ratio measures changes in the intensity of the 
relationship between managerial effort and compensation. Ratio in their research, 
which included 102 buyouts with pre and post information, was 4,14. While a large 
percentage of post-buyouts suggest that the management team tries to maximize 
value after the buyouts, they also tend to “cash out” at the time of a buyout. 
Management team`s cash out may cause adverse ex ante incentive effects which 
means that value of their pre-buyout equity lowers while post-buyout equity 
ownership has risen. Kaplan and Stein also calculated median ratios for the dollar 
value of post- to pre-buyout equity using sample of 124 management buyouts 
between 1980-1989. Ratio 0,46 indicates that management team invests almost half 
in post-buyout equity compared to what they receive for pre-buyout equity (Kaplan 
& Stein 1993: 341-342). 
 Similarly Guo et al. (2011) argue that company`s managements greater equity 
proportions provided for the buyout are in alignment to larger management 
incentives with shareholders. Their sample consisted of 94 post-buyout samples and 
in 58 (about 62%) of the deals management invested equity for the buyout (Guo et 
al. 2011: 498).      
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3.2.3 Operational engineering 
 
In addition to financial and governance engineering, private equity firms use their 
operating knowledge in order to find profitable investments, to create value creation 
plan for these investments and to implement these plans. Due to a situation in debt 
markets and modern business model, private equity firms focus more on developing 
operating effectiveness of the investee company. As mentioned earlier, 
improvements in operational performance lead to greater economical value. (Kaplan 
& Strömberg 2009: 130-132).  
Berg & Gottschalg (2005) argues that the development in operational effectiveness 
has impact on operating margins and cash flow of the company. These 
improvements are achieved with more efficient overall productivity and more 
efficient operations. Private equity firms start to tighten cost control immediately 
after the acquisition (Berg & Gottschalg 2005: 20). Muscarella & Vetsuypens 
(1990) confirms that most firms disclosed activities after the LBO. They found that 
57 out of 72 (75%) firms closed at least one of the ongoing activities since the LBO 
(Muscarella & Vetsuypens 1990: 1396).  
According to Nikoskelainen (2006), European LBOs provide value creation 
opportunities through improved cash flow and growth possibilities. Characteristics 
for typical LBO target are relatively low gearing, relatively low EBITDA margin, 
high cash flow volatility, relatively high operating profit and high turnover on 
assets. Therefore the real value is created through improved operating efficiency 
and growth (Nikoskelainen 2006: 332).  
Guo et al (2011) investigated the potential determinants of returns to pre- and post-
buyout capital and the proportion of the return that can be explained by changes in 
operating performance. Determinants being investigated were operating 
performance, valuation multiple and impact of realized tax benefits on returns. 
Findings suggest that there is a 22,9% adjusted change of the return to pre-buyout 
capital and 18,5% change to post-buyout capital in operating performance. Positive 
results could also result from changes in industry or markets and 17,7% of the 
return to pre-buyout capital and 12% to post-buyout capital were due to changes in 
valuation multiple/changes in industry valuation. Last 33,8% (pre-buyout) and 
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44,5% (post-buyout) of the changes in returns were due to tax benefits of debt. (Guo 
et al. 2011: 503-509).  
Cressy et al. (2007) discovered that private equity firms’ expertise in some industry 
causes competitive advantage over other private equity firms, which are not 
specialized. Premium contributed for this expertise is between 6% and 8,5%. 
Profitability and efficiency of the PE-backed firm during the buyout year, affected 
significantly to its post-buyout profitability. These findings suggest that expertise in 
investment selection and financial engineering explain improved performance more 
than management incentives for example (Cressy et al. 2007: 666-667). In a risk 
adjusted-basis, private equity funds average returns after management fees have not 
been as large as many investors have though (Conroy & Harris 2007: 106).              
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4. EVIDENCE OF VALUE CREATION IN LEVERAGED 
BUYOUTS 
 
4.1 Operational performance 
 
There is large empirical evidence of the increase of operating performance of 
companies acquired with leveraged buyouts. According to Kaplan & Strömberg 
(2009) the operating income to sales ratio increased 10-20% and cash flow to sales 
ratio increased about 40% during the 1980s private equity deals (public to private 
deals), while capital expenditures to sales- ratio lowered. Therefore the value of 
private equity portfolio companies increased during the first leveraged buyout wave 
in the 1980s.  (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009: 132). 
 Guo et al. (2011) investigates U.S public-to-private transactions between 1990 and 
2006 and it provides similar results while points that increase in cash flow and 
operating margin are more conservative than in the 1980s. Deals between 1990 and 
2006 are much more conservatively priced and contain less leverage than deals 
made in the 1980s while deals still include caused default risk to companies. Guo et 
al. describes: “The returns to either pre-or post-buyout capital invested on average 
are large and positive, and are positive for all outcome groups except those ending 
in a distressed restructuring”. LBO-gains regarding operating performance are 
higher than gains for their industry counterparts and increased operating 
performance accounted for about 20% of the returns compared to pre-buyout 
capital. Due to a larger leverage, the cash flow of the company increases while the 
replacement of the CEO also boosts company`s cash flow. Returns from tax benefits 
depend on if the leverage will be held until the exit from portfolio-company. 
Authors remind that these LBO returns might not occur under other credit and 
market conditions. (Guo et al. 2011: 514). 
Cohn et al. (2014) investigates financial structure of LBO and performance after 
LBOs and contains evidence from 317 LBOs between 1995-2007. Authors found 
only little evidence of LBOs improvement on the operating performance of the 
acquired company, while these results do not necessarily generalize the entire 
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population of LBOs because of limited data sources. Leverage and debt levels of the 
acquired company increase after the LBO (Cohn et al. 2014: 493).  
Scellato & Ughetto (2013) investigates whether European buyouts have an impact 
on the performance of the target company`s performance during the three year 
period after the buyout. Asset and employee growth rates are higher in companies 
undergoing a buyout than in non-buyout companies. Thus there is a lack of 
evidence from the impact of controlling companies regarding the profitability of the 
acquired company. The buyout variable and average profitability of PE-backed 
company are not correlated three years after buyout. Increases in total assets and 
improved EBITDA figure seem not to be large enough in order to improve the 
profitability of the company. These findings are opposite to results of previous 
studies conducted in the 1980s that show improvements in performance and 
profitability of the company post-LBO (Scellato & Ughetto 2013: 2648). 
Groh & Gottschalg (2006) analyzes the financial performance of 199 U.S buyout 
investments between 1984-2004 and compares buyout returns to S&P 500 index 
portfolio returns. There is a significant alpha for buyouts, which means that buyout 
returns are larger than returns of the control portfolio and therefore the study 
suggests that buyouts would be able to outperform S&P 500 index and create 
abnormal returns. According to authors, buyout investors detect industries that have 
low operating risk while they use leverage to finance the transactions. By using 
leverage as a tool, private equity firms transfer part from the risk to the risk lenders. 
(Groh & Gottschalg 2006: Sivu)      
Braub & Latham (2009) suggests that board characteristics predict whether the 
performance of the acquired company is going to be positive or not and 
modification to company board causes changes to firm performance. It can be 
assumed that the buyout company and banks are involved in company board 
structuring due to the fact that both want to raise company`s operational 
performance. Results indicate that increases in board sizes after the LBO caused 
positive improvements to the company`s performance while changes to smaller 
boards have a negative impact on the performance. Authors found also evidence for 
the under-valuation hypothesis as potential LBO- candidates have high agency costs 
of cash flow (low growth prospects and large free cash flow). These findings 
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suggest that boards and board modifications are an additional source of value 
creation in leveraged buyouts and improve operational performance of the portfolio 
company (Braub & Latham 2009: 721-722). 
Colla et al. (2011) investigates impact of leverage in buyouts using a sample of 238 
LBOs between 1997 and 2008. The study shows that the use of leverage in LBOs 
affect positively to the company`s profitability. Authors remark that “ Use of debt 
and its pricing are simultaneously determined and find that spreads increase with 
leverage, after accounting for the endogeneity of leverage in the spread 
regressions”. There are also differences in types of lenders, as senior investors tend 
to lend more generously during hot buyout markets. This supports a theory that 
when debt is cheap, there is an oversupply of debt to finance buyouts.  (Colla et al. 
2011: 136).  
Similarly, Achleitner et al. (2010) investigates European buyouts between 1991-
2005 with sample of 206 buyout transactions and concludes that the leverage is 
explaining the returns to private equity firm by improving the return on equity 
percentage. The effect of leverage accounted for about 33.3% of the value creation 
and the rest can be attributed to operational improvements and changes in EBITDA 
multiples (Achleitner et al. 2010: 25).   
Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) points similarly that companies are now focusing more 
on operational engineering than in financial engineering and governance 
engineering (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009: 132). 
These findings on the effect of the buyout on operating performance of the acquired 
company from previous academic studies suggest that there is not enough evidence 
on improvements in the company´s performance and profitability over different 
time periods (1980-2014). Similarly, Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) argues that more 
recent evidence from impacts of LBOs to company`s operating performance is 
needed (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009: 131) 
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4.2 Value creation in funds 
 
According to Harris et al. (2013), evidence of private equity firm’s performance is 
still uncertain, while there has been a large increase in investments to private equity 
funds. Uncertainty is mainly caused by limited amount of data available for research 
purposes. (Harris et al. 2013: 3). Previous studies and empirical findings provide 
controversial results from performance of the private equity fund investments 
compared to public investments. There is a large amount of studies that support the 
theory that private equity funds have created positive abnormal returns compared to 
other investments. 
Ljungqvist & Richardson (2003) made a cross-sectional analysis of the excess 
internal rate of returns (IRR) and concluded that private equity investments create 
five to eight percent higher annual returns compared to public alternatives. Excess 
returns of private equity are related to timing, portfolio company risk measurements 
and to different measurement methodologies. (Ljungqvist & Richardson 2003: 28).  
Jenkinson & Sousa (2014) investigates determinants of exit decisions for leveraged 
buyouts with a large sample of 1022 European private equity exits. Exiting from 
portfolio company investment is an important decision for private equity fund. 
Private equity firm has three ways to deliver the exit; first, and probably the best 
known is the IPO (Initial Public Offering), second is the trade sale (Sale to another 
company), and third, the secondary exit (Sale to another private equity fund). When 
exiting, private equity firms’ aim is to get the best price possible from the selling of 
Portfolio Company. Capital market conditions offer different windows for exits. For 
example, secondary buyouts are the most profitable exit route when IPO- markets 
are cold and there is a higher availability of cheap debt and large amount of 
committed capital, which is not yet invested in the private equity industry. Study 
suggests that capital market conditions are the most important determinant of the 
exit decision. When stock markets are increasing steadily, the usage of IPOs seem 
to be larger compared to usage of secondary buyouts while facing cheap debt 
markets, situation is vice versa. Previous academic literature largely presumes that 
IPOs are superior exit route for private equity funds, while later literature does not 
take it for granted automatically. For example, Jenkinson & Sousa points, ”At the 
IPO, the private equity owner is only able to sell a proportion of their holding, and 
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is subject to a lengthy lock-up on the reminder”. Therefore, the selling of stakes 
remaining can take a while and thus private equity funds are also interested in 
secondary sales (Jenkinson & Sousa 2015: 400-407).                   
Robinson & Sensoy (2011) conducted a study with sample of 837 funds between 
1984-2010 and found similar results than Ljungqvist & Richardson. Private equity 
funds performances were in sample 15 % higher than public companies 
performances. Private equity fund returns outperformed indices even their 
performance was calculated relative to a leveraged counterpart in the public index 
matching estimates of portfolio company beta. Buyout funds outperformed the S&P 
500 index by 18%. See table 2 (Robinson & Sensoy 2011: 1-28). 
Higson & Stucke (2012) compared the IRR numbers of U.S buyout funds and S&P 
500 between 1980-2000 and found that more than 60% of private equity funds 
outperformed the S&P 500- index. In their research average fund outperformed the 
median counterpart and therefore the impact of positive outliers was significant. See 
table 3 (Higson & Stucke 2012: 3).  
Thus, there is a large amount of studies that suggest private equity funds do not 
outperform other investments classes. Kaserer & Diller (2004) found that about 
66% of the European private equity funds between 1989-2003 underperformed in 
comparison to MSCI Europe Equity Index. (Kaserer & Diller 2004: 46). 
Kaplan & Schoar (2005) provides similar results; calculated with weighted 
committed capital, buyout funds were not able outperform the S&P 500 in returns 
between 1980-1997 while venture funds were able generate larger returns than 
index (Kaplan & Schoar 2005: 1821). Similarly Phalippou & Gottschalg (2009) 
found that average private equity fund outperforms S&P 500 before fees by 3% 
while it underperforms after fees by 3% (Phalippou & Gottschalg 2009: 1774). 
Driessen et al. (2012) suggests that buyouts funds have relatively low market beta 
and that there is now evidence of outperformance. (Driessen et al. 2012: 511). One 
explanation for these mixed results could be the fee structure of the private equity 
fund. Studies mentioned earlier clearly indicate that there is large gap between 
gross-of-fees and net-of-fees returns. Before taking the fees into account, large 
amount of private equity funds seem to outperform the public indices. After fees 
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private equity funds seem to underperform against the public equity markets 
returns. These findings suggest that after taking fees into account private equity 
fund is able to generate about similar returns than public equity markets and in 
some cases even lower. These findings also suggest that two main factors 
explaining private equity fund returns are the performance persistence effect and 
money chasing deals- phenomena.  
Contrarily Gompers & Lerner (2000) found that increased fundraising and prices 
are not due to better investment prospects as demand in vintage fundraising periods 
drives prices up (Gompers & Lerner 2000: 321). As a conclusion, it can be said that 
more studies and research from private equity funds performance is needed in the 
future. Private equity as an investment class is still quite new and there is still not 
clear evidence of positive abnormal returns of private equity fund in comparison to 
public counterparts, while huge amount of capital is committed to the private equity 
industry every year.  
 
 
Table 2: Buyout fund comparison to public databases, Robinson & Sensoy 2011: 
38) 
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Table 3: Full sample of U.S buyout funds benchmarked against the S&P 500, 
(Higson & Stucke 2012: 33)  
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This part defines the data and methodology used in this thesis. Thus, the part 
contains information about the data selection of the study. Furthermore, this part 
includes descriptive statistics of the buyout sample and methodology and variables 
of the thesis. Study uses different methods in order to provide answer whether the 
null hypothesis is rejected. Table 3 shows the distribution of the private equity 
transactions. Significantly largest amount of entries in the data set were conducted 
in 2008 when there was 24 private equity entries (20,9 %). Table shows that there 
were also 13 (11.3 %) private equity entries in 2010, which is interesting due to 
difficult situation in the financial markets. On the other hand, largest amount of 
exits in the dataset were conducted in 2016 when there were 20 exits (17,4 %). 
Furthermore, when looking at the industry distribution, significantly largest amount 
of target companies operated within ether business & industrial products (18,3 %) 
or business & industrial services industry (18,3 %). Also the datasset contains only 
one target company that operates under energy & environment industry.         
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Table 4. Distribution of buyout the sample by industry (Entry/ Exit).  
 
 
5.1 Data Description 
 
Data sample of this study is hand collected and adjusted in order to meet standards 
fro the study. Thus, the final sample includes 230 Finnish private equity LBO- 
transactions between 2002 and 2017. Furthermore, the data-sample is restricted to 
Finnish companies and contains only Finnish PE- firms. Furthermore, the dataset is 
collected from income statements and balance sheets of the target companies at the 
entry and exit. Raw sample included roughly 600 private equity transactions. 
Industry Entry	Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Agriculture 0 0,0	%
Chemicals	&	Materials 2 1 1 2 2 1 9 7,8	%
Business	&	Industrial	Products 2 4 4 2 2 3 2 1 1 21 18,3	%
Business	&	Industrial	Services 2 3 2 7 3 2 1 1 21 18,3	%
Construction 0 1 2 3 2,6	%
Transportation 2 1 3 2,6	%
Consumer	Goods	&	Retail 3 2 1 3 2 3 1 15 13,0	%
Consumer	Services;	Other 1 1 2 1 5 4,3	%
Energy	&	Environment 1 1 0,9	%
Financial	Services 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 11 9,6	%
Real	Estate 1 2 1 1 5 4,3	%
Communications 1 1 2 4 3,5	%
Computer	&	Consumer	Electronics 2 1 1 4 3,5	%
Life	Sciences 1 3 1 3 3 1 1 13 11,3	%
Number	of	observations 4 0 14 10 18 11 24 9 13 5 2 1 3 1 0 0 115 100	%
3,5	% 0,0	% 12,2	% 8,7	% 15,7	% 9,6	% 20,9	% 7,8	% 11,3	% 4,3	% 1,7	% 0,9	% 2,6	% 0,9	% 0,0	% 0,0	% 100,0	%
Industry Exit	Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Agriculture 0 0,0	%
Chemicals	&	Materials 1 1 1 2 2 2 9 7,8	%
Business	&	Industrial	Products 1 2 5 4 1 5 3 21 18,3	%
Business	&	Industrial	Services 3 3 4 2 2 1 6 21 18,3	%
Construction 1 2 3 2,6	%
Transportation 2 1 3 2,6	%
Consumer	Goods	&	Retail 4 1 1 2 4 1 2 15 13,0	%
Consumer	Services;	Other 2 1 1 1 5 4,3	%
Energy	&	Environment 1 1 0,9	%
Financial	Services 1 1 2 1 4 2 11 9,6	%
Real	Estate 2 1 1 1 5 4,3	%
Communications 1 1 2 4 3,5	%
Computer	&	Consumer	Electronics 1 1 2 4 3,5	%
Life	Sciences 1 1 1 3 3 1 3 13 11,3	%
Number	of	observations 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 4 15 15 10 19 6 18 20 3 115
0,0	% 0,0	% 0,0	% 0,0	% 0,9	% 1,7	% 1,7	% 3,5	% 13,0	% 13,0	% 8,7	% 16,5	% 5,2	% 15,7	% 17,4	% 2,6	% 100,0	%
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Despite large amount financial statements of the target companies, the final sample 
for the actual study is considerably smaller due to a limited availability of the 
annual reports of the target companies in exit or entry years. Purpose of the study is 
to compare entry figures to the exit-figures of the buyout and investigate the real 
affect of the private equity ownership to the performance of the target company. 
Furthermore, the study investigates whether private equity firm is able to enhance 
the operational performance of the buyout-target. Table 4 presents statistics and 
financial determinants obtained from the financial statements of the target 
companies.  
This study investigates Finnish private equity transactions between 2002 and 2017. 
Thus the purpose of this study is to investigate whether private equity firms are able 
to increase the operational performance and enterprise value of the target company. 
Furthermore, the questions is that are private equity company’s valuable to the 
target companies or are they hunting merely financial opportunities. Previous 
academic literature indicates that private equity firms are often able increase value 
of the target company while there are only a handful of studies conducted about 
Finnish private equity field. Time period of 2002-2017 contains multiple crisis and 
market turmoil, but also strong uprising of the economy. In the beginning of 2000-
century the internet-bubble caused multiple bankruptcies. Furthermore, the financial 
crisis in 2008 reflected heavily on markets and private equity field.  
The transactions for the dataset of this study are hand-collect by using web pages 
and personnel of private equity companies. The Finnish Venture Capital 
Association (FVCA) also helped building dataset of the study and association 
provided valuable help to data gathering process. As mentioned earlier, the dataset 
is hand-collected and obtained from the personnel and the web-pages of the Finnish 
private equity firms. Figures of the target companies are from the archive of the 
National Bureau and registration of Finland (NBPR). Furthermore, the assistance of 
NBPR was critical for the study as they offered a permission to use their archive 
and VIRRE-service. Thus, the service provided the financial statements of the target 
companies. Finally, the data for regressions was calculated from the financial 
statements of the target companies. 
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The study uses also data from smaller target companies, but the data does not 
contain venture capital transactions. Private equity firms being used in this study 
concentrate on buyout transactions instead of venture capital transactions. To be 
pointed, the data gathering process was not easy and took great amount of time, 
while it was necessary to conduct gathering process manually as there are no 
publicly available datasets, which contain a large sample of Finnish private equity 
transactions. The data is gathered from different sources and contains different 
types of buyout deals. Furthermore, the data sample contains both public- to private 
deals and private-to-private transactions. Similar to Kielenniva (2014), it can be 
seen as advantage that previous academic literature focuses on public-to-private 
transactions. Thus, the data contains only buyout transactions, which include all 
necessary information and therefore many buyout transactions had to be left out of 
the final sample. Biggest problems of the data gathering process were the 
investigation about time of entry and exit year and the availability of right and 
comprehensive financial statements of the target companies as many of the financial 
statement were in different forms and covered some information differently. 
Furthermore, it must be pointed that results are subjected to biased upwards as the 
sample may include more successful deals.  
 
5.2 Regression variables  
     
Logarithmic change in EV of the target company is used as a dependent variable in 
regression. Thus, the data uses simple equations mentioned earlier in the study. 
Value of the company is calculated by using these formulas.  
(1) EV= Book Equity + Net debt. 
Delta(EV)i.t= Log (1+ EVi,exit )-log(1+EVi,entry) 
 
The change of EVi is the change in EV of the target company over time-period of t. 
EVi.entry is the EV for portfolio company I at the entry year. EVi,exit is the EV for 
portfolio company I at the exit.  
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Furthermore, the operational improvements are investigated by using the EBITDA 
as it stands as generally used as a proxy for free cash flow of the target company. 
Furthermore, it is commonly used in valuation methods of the private equity 
companies (Achleitner et al. 2011:151; Guo et al. 2011; Acharya et al. 2013). Thus, 
in order to test the hypothesis, the deltas are calculated for the respective operating 
performance measures (EBITDA/ Sales ratio and sales growth). Furthermore, the 
deltas are calculated for entry and exit years of PE ownership for the target 
companies. The equation for deltas is following: 
 
(2) DeltaP(i.t) = Log(1+Pi.exit)- log(1+pi.entry) 
DeltaP(i.t) is the change in EBITDA margin, and sales growth of the target 
company during the holding period t. Pi.entry refers to sales and EBITDA margin 
for the entry and Pi.exit for the exit years of target companies, respectively.  
 
Similarly with study of Achleitner et al. (2011), the EV/ EBITDA multiple is used 
as an independent variable in the regression analyses. The EV/EBITDA multiple at 
the exit is compared to the entry figure. The EV/ EBITDA multiple cannot be 
calculated as a logarithmic number as the sample contains also negative EBITDA 
values. Furthermore, the difference in the EBITDA multiple is measured by 
comparing exit value with the entry value.  
 
(3) DeltaPi,t = Pi,exit/ Pi,entry 
Where DeltaPi,t is operating performance change in the EBITDA multiple for firm 
over the holding period t. Pi.entry and Pi,exit refer to the EBITDA/ Sales ratio for 
the entry and exit year of the target companies, respectively.  
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5.3 Methodology 
 
The study uses univariate analysis test for testing hypothesis about the magnitude of 
the operational improvements during the buyout period. The test investigates the 
difference of the entry and exit figures of the target companies. The test calculates 
the median of delta change in enterprise value and in operating performance 
measures between the entry and exit year of the target company. Furthermore, the 
study uses univariate analysis compares only median values due to high skewness 
of the median values. I use two alternative change measures for univariate analysis 
depending on the performance measure under study. For sales growth and EBITDA 
margin improvements, the difference in logarithmic change between the exit and 
entry year of the measure is calculated and tested for difference from zero: 
 
(4) DeltaP(i.t) = Log (1+ Pi,exit)- log( 1+ Pi,entry) 
Delta P(i.t) is a performance change in the EBITDA margin and sales growth for the 
firm i over the holding period t. Pi,entry and Pi,exit refer to sales figure and 
EBITDA/sales ratio for the entry and exit year of target companies. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the EBITDA multiple changes that contain negative values 
the calculation is simplified just by deducting the entry multiple from the exit 
multiple. Furthermore, the data would be biased if the negative value would not be 
included.  
 
(5) DeltaP(i,t) = Pi(exit)- Pi(entry) 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter shows the empirical findings of the value creation in buyout-target 
companies. Thus, the descriptive statistics for the study are presented at first part of 
the chapter. Furthermore, the part shows the raw descriptive statistics and mean, 
median, max, min and standard deviation of the different variables. Second part of 
the chapter shows how much private equity firms are able to increase the value of 
the target company. Finally the last part of the chapter shows findings for the 
multivariate regressions.  
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 
The table above shows the raw descriptive statistics for the study. Statistics for the 
full sample at entry are presented above the exit figures of the sample. Mean sales at 
entry point are 18.7 million euros while at exit phase they are at 41.3 million euros. 
This indicates strong growth in sales figures of the target company. Furthermore, 
there is also increase in median sales as well. Median sales increased from 2.1 
million to 6.6 millions, which supports H1 and indicate that private equity firms are 
able to increase sales of the target companies. Also the total assets of target 
Full	Sample	(at	entry) Obs. Mean	 Median 	Max Min Std	Dev
Sales	(EUR	m) 115 18,7 2,1 469,2 0,0 52,0
Total	assets	(EUR	m) 115 24,7 5,6 345,8 0,0 56,2
EBITDA	(EUR	m) 115 -0,1 -0,1 9,2 -24,9 3,9
Book	Equity	(EUR	m) 115 6,3 1,0 137,7 -2,3 18,5
Net	Debt	(EUR	m) 115 20,5 3,0 346,9 -2,5 51,0
EV,	enterprise	value	(EUR	m) 115 26,9 4,6 484,7 0,0 67,5
Entry	year 115 2007 2008 2015 2002 2,7
Exit	year 115 2013 2013 2017 2006 0,0
Holding	period	(years) 115 5,5 5,0 12,0 0,0 2,6
Profitability
EBITDA/Sales	(margin) 115 -17296,2 0,0 1,7 -1164908,8 113748,3
EBITDA/	Total	assets 115 -0,1 0,0 0,5 -2,9 0,4
EV/EBITDA	(multiple) 115 -67,6 -1,2 387,6 -6770,0 632,9
Leverage
Net	debt/	Equity 115 25,1 1,9 1317,6 -161,8 173,3
Net	debt/	EV 115 0,6 0,7 2,0 -5,1 0,7
Employment
Sales/	Employee	(EUR	th) 115 127405,4 72888,5 1696858,8 0,3 213367,9
Personnel	costs/	Sales 115 3236,7 0,5 205229,9 -22982,0 21231,5
Working	capital 115
Net	working	Capital/	Sales 115 206008,9 0,7 20408837,1 0,1 1903220,2
Full	Sample	(at	Exit) Obs. Mean	 Median 	Max Min Std	Dev
Sales	(EUR	m) 115 41,3 6,6 711,0 0,0 105,3
Total	assets	(EUR	m) 115 33,6 8,0 383,1 0,1 66,7
EBITDA	(EUR	m) 115 0,3 0,0 33,7 -46,0 8,2
Book	Equity	(EUR	m) 115 8,8 1,1 152,8 -129,7 29,2
Net	Debt	(EUR	m) 115 31,1 8,3 469,7 -0,2 66,5
EV,	enterprise	value	(EUR	m) 115 40,0 9,8 622,5 0,0 84,5
Entry	year 115 2007 2008 2015 2002 2,7
Exit	year 115 2013 2013 2017 2006 2,6
Holding	period	(years) 115 5,5 5,0 12,0 0,0 2,6
Profitability
EBITDA/Sales	(margin) 115 -7243,2 0,0 2,9 -766362,0 71365,7
EBITDA/	Total	assets 115 -0,1 0,0 0,8 -5,7 0,6
EV/EBITDA	(multiple) 115 17,4 1,6 1888,5 -689,8 243,5
Leverage
Net	debt/	Equity 115 4,2 1,9 97,0 -75,2 17,2
Net	debt/	EV 115 61342,4 0,9 7054156,2 -0,7 654937,0
Employment
Sales/	Employee	(EUR	th) 115 193495,5 125363,7 1812952,0 -1269,7 261931,9
Personnel	costs/	Sales 115 1817,0 0,4 208878,5 -0,3 19393,1
Working	capital
Net	working	Capital/	Sales 115 2049,4 0,4 235066,7 -1158,6 21824,8
  
45 
companies increase during the holding period. Thus, the mean total assets increased 
from 24.7 million to 33.6 million and median of total assets increased from5.6 
million to 8 million euros. When looking at mean EBITDA figure of the entry and 
exit samples, the EBITDA for the entry is negative (-0.1 million) while at exit the 
figure is positive (0.3 million). Net debt of the target companies increased from 20.5 
million to 31.5 million. Furthermore, the median net debt increased from 3 million 
to 8.3 millions. Descriptive statistics also indicate that private equity firms have 
impact on enterprise value of the target companies. Thus, the mean enterprise value 
(EV) increased from 26.9 million to 40 million euros. Also, the median enterprise 
value (EV) more than doubled during the holding period (from 4.6 million to 9.8 
million. Average length of the holding period was 5.5 years and median 5 years 
respectively. As mentioned earlier, private equity companies aim to increase the 
operating performance of the target and therefore PE companies might run either 
reductions to the personnel or personnel costs of the target company. Furthermore, 
this can be seen also in results of this study as personnel costs compared to sales 
decreases by 46%, which can be seen as a remarkable amount. In contrast, the 
sample shows that working capital compared to sales during the private equity 
ownership. Net working capital compared to sales decreased by 42,8% during the 
holding period of the target company.   
	
6.1 Value creation in PE-backed portfolio companies 
 
 
 
Table 6. Raw median changes in operating performance 
EV Sales	Growth EBITDA/	Sales
EBITDA/	
Total	Assets EV/	EBITDA
Net	Debt/	
Equity
Sales/	
Employee
	Mean 0,20 606982,30 1029368 3,56 44,82 9,04 10190,54
	Median 0,07 2,38 0,15 0,47 0,30 0,53 1,79
	Maximum 2,63 50505435 118000000 312,08 5485,80 1021,05 572485,5
	Minimum -4,66 0 -3902,5 -52,01 -331,04 -210,07 -0,01
	Std.	Dev. 1,27 4816341 11039102 34,04 513,06 98,77 59021,37
	Skewness -0,51 9,86 10,58 7,26 10,64 9,40 8,04
	Kurtosis 4,03 102,06 113,01 63,27 113,87 97,77 73,99
	Observations 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
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Table 6. presents the median changes in target company’s operating performance 
and figures. Table shows that private equity firms are able increase the enterprise 
value (EV) of target companies. Furthermore, the mean in increase in enterprise 
value of the target company was 20% and median increase 7%. Thus the standard 
deviation for change in enterprise value of the target company was 1,27. Means of 
delta sales growth, change of EBITDA compared to sales, change of EBITDA to 
total assets and change of sales per employee are affected by occasions where the 
sales has been zero at entry point and positive at exit. Therefore, these results are 
not statistically significant, while median figures indicate better results of private 
equity ownership. Median change in sales growth was 236%. Furthermore, this is 
indicates that private equity firm by controlling the target company is able to 
increase sales growth of the investee company. This finding supports previous 
academic literature when considering hypothesis of private equity firm’s ability to 
increase performance of the target company by increasing sales and turnover of the 
company. Median changes in EBITDA-margin were increases by about 15% and 
thus indicate that operating performance of target companies is enhanced during the 
holding period. Similar results also apply to median change to EV/EBITDA- ratio. 
Furthermore, private equity firms are able to increase the median EV/EBITDA-ratio 
by about 30%. Mean change in leverage level of the target increased by about 
900%, which is not statistically significant though. Median leverage level of the 
target company increases by 53% during the holding period. Median increase in 
sales for one employee was also significant and thus increased by 179%.    
 
 
Significance levels are based on Wilcoxon signed-rank test. ***, ** and * denotes 
levels that are significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively 
Table 7. Median operational improvements of the LBOs 
Full	sample
EV	Growth
Delta	Log	EV 0,22	(115;73)***
Operational	profiability
Delta	Log	Sales 0,38	(115;86)***
Delta	EBITDA/Sales 0,15	(115;71)
Delta	EV/EBITDA 0,004	(115;72)
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First hypothesis of the study was that there is a positive relationship between private 
equity ownership and the operating performance of the target company during the 
holding period of the sponsor. Table 6 presents median operational improvements 
of the LBOs backed and exited by Finnish private equity firms. Furthermore, the 
results indicate that private equity firms have been able to increase the growth of the 
target companies and operational profitability of the investee companies. Thus the 
median leverage buyout transaction is therefore net positive when considering 
growth and operation profitability of the target company. Delta median enterprise 
value of the target company increased by 22% and was statistically significant at 
10% significance level. Results are positive for changes in enterprise value despite 
that sample covers times of financial crisis and global recession. Furthermore this 
highlights the power of private equity sponsors. The sample also includes recovery 
period, which might have had affects on these results. Private equity firms are also 
able to increase median logarithmic sales of the target company by 38 % during the 
holding period. In contrast to positive results with changes in enterprise value and 
sales, changes with EBITDA- margin and multiple were not statistically significant.    
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7. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Purpose of this study was to investigate key determinants of leveraged buyout 
investments (LBOs) and possible improvements in portfolio company´s operational 
performance. The study investigates whether private equity firms have been able to 
create large returns by using LBOs and what are the effects of these transactions for 
the acquired company. The thesis concentrates on the latest evidence from LBOs, 
while literature and studies from previous decades cannot be sided. In this thesis, 
the evidence of leveraged buyout value creation has been reviewed by using earlier 
research, literature and empirical findings. Due to a lack of studies contributed on 
Finnish LBO transactions considering value creation and operational performance, 
the study uses theory from European and U.S. buyouts. Improvements in 
operational performance and value creation in funds have been investigated by 
using earlier studies and by conducting empirical study about the effects of 
leveraged buyout investments to portfolio company´s operational performance and 
value creation to portfolio investors.  
Third chapter of this thesis investigated key drivers of value creation. Private equity 
firm´s aim is to improve the operational performance and thereby improve the 
overall value of the portfolio company. On the basis of previous literature, it can be 
concluded that value creation in buyouts is due to financial engineering, 
governance engineering and operational engineering.  
Contrarily to the result regarding to key value drivers, improvements in portfolio 
company´s operational performance are mixed. It seems that private equity firm´s 
ability to enhance operational performance of the portfolio company, is dependent 
on the situation in the debt markets. Improvements in operating income and cash 
flow compared to sales figure explains increased value of the portfolio company 
during the first leveraged buyout boom in the 1980s. However, improvements in 
operating margin and cash flow have become more conservative. Guo et al. (2011) 
points that LBO deals between 1990 and 2006 were much more conservatively 
priced and contained less leverage than deals made in the 1980s, which explains 
smaller improvement in portfolio company´s operational performance (Guo et al. 
2011: 514). 
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It seems that leverage, in more recent studies, is explaining returns and value 
creation less than in earlier studies, while operational improvements are considered 
more important. Therefore, it can be concluded that operational engineering and 
governance engineering are considered more important than financial engineering in 
recent years, while the situation in the debt markets must be noticed. Contrarily 
there is also evidence that LBOs do not necessarily improve portfolio company´s 
operational performance. These findings might suggest that there might be 
differences between European and U.S. LBOs. Overall it can be concluded that 
private equity firm´s are often able to improve portfolio company´s performance, 
while sometimes improvements are remain smaller partly due to situation in the 
debt markets.   
Findings regarding to value creation of private equity funds are mixed. Previous 
studies and empirical findings provide controversial results from performance of the 
private equity fund investments compared to public investments. Findings suggest 
that, private equity fund is often able to create similar returns to investors than 
public counterparts. One explanation for these mixed results could be the fee 
structure of the private equity fund. There is large gap between gross-of-fees and 
net-of-fees returns. Before taking the fees into account, large amount of private 
equity funds seem to outperform the public indices. After fees private equity funds 
seem to underperform against the public equity markets returns. These findings 
suggest that after taking fees into account private equity fund is able to generate 
about similar returns than public equity markets and in some cases even lower. 
These findings also suggest that two main factors explaining private equity fund 
returns are the performance persistence effect and money chasing deals- 
phenomena.  
As mentioned in previous academic literature, the more research is required about 
private transactions. Furthermore, purpose of this thesis is to investigate leverage 
buyout transactions and more detailed acquisitions that have been supported by 
Finnish private equity companies between a period of 2002 and 2017. The study 
uses dataset that has been gathered from financial statements of the investee 
companies from the archive of the National Bureau and registration of Finland 
(NBPR). Furthermore, the assistance of NBPR was critical for the study as they 
offered a permission to use their archive and VIRRE-service. The dataset of study 
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includes 115 target companies. Also, the Finnish Venture Capital Association also 
helped in this study and offered valuable help to data gathering. List of target 
companies was obtained from web sites and personnel of the Finnish private equity 
companies. Furthermore, the purpose of the study is to present new results and 
evidence about how private equity companies are able affect on the performance 
and value of the investee companies with leverage buyout transactions. Thus, 
currently there are quite a few studies that concentrate on the transactions of Finnish 
private equity companies. Therefore the academic theory is collected mostly from 
Europe and United States.    
Empirical results of this study are line with previous academic literature and support 
hypothesis that private equity firms have positive affect on the enterprise value of 
the target company during the holding period. Furthermore, the median change in 
enterprise value is used to as it is least affected by large differences in the sample. 
Descriptive statistics show that median enterprise values of the target company 
increased from 4.6 million to 9.6 million euros (116%). Furthermore, the raw 
median change in enterprise value was 7% respectively. These results indeed 
indicate that Finnish private equity firms have been able enhance the enterprise 
value (EV) of the investee companies and therefore H1 is supported.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2) of the study was whether leveraged buyout transactions with 
higher sales growth during the holding period yield a higher enterprise value. Thus 
results indicate that there is a strong correlation between growth in sales and 
enterprise value of the target company. Therefore, increase in sales can be seen as a 
critical value driver of leverage buyout transactions. Relationship between sales 
growth and enterprise value is statistically significant at 10% significance level 
respectively. There is a strong relationship between sales growth and increase in 
enterprise value of the target company, but when considering other value drivers, 
there were no significant effect on the enterprise value growth of the target 
company. Furthermore, the EBITDA compared to sales (EBITDA margin) and 
enterprise value compared to EBITDA (EBITDA multiple), did not have significant 
effect on the enterprise value of the target company. As a conclusion, it can be said 
that that second hypothesis only partly confirmed.  
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As a conclusion it is clear that there is demand for more scientific papers and 
research about Finnish private equity transactions in order to verify results of the 
study. In sum, the data sample contains leverage buyout transactions from quite 
different time periods as the time period covers period of international financial 
crisis and recession. Furthermore, the lack of availability data, which is natural 
when taking account the nature of the private equity field, can be seen as a difficult 
when investigating Finnish leverage buyout transactions. Furthermore, whether the 
data in the field of Finnish private equity and leverage buyout transactions will ever 
be available for large extent is unlikely as the size of Finnish private equity field 
relatively small and contains few players. Furthermore, there is also need for further 
research about the long-term impacts of the private equity ownership, and research 
on how has operational performance of the Finnish target companies developed 
after the holding period.      
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. List of target companies and private equity firms included in the study 
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Target	Company Private	Equity	Firm Entry	 Exit
Savcor	Group	Ltd	Oy Capman	Oyj 2002 2007
StaffPoint	Oy Capman	Oyj 2002 2008
Suomen	Tenava	päiväkodit	Oy Helmet	Capital 2002 2010
Tieturi Capman	Oyj 2002 2013
Toolfac	Oy Canelco	capital 2004 2007
JPP-Soft	Oy Midinvest	management 2004 2009
Oy	Linseed	Protein	Finland	Ltd Midinvest	management 2004 2010
Upstream	Engineering	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2004 2010
DelSiTech	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2004 2010
Linseed	Protein	Finland	Ltd Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2004 2010
Ellibs	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2004 2011
Tokmanni	Oy Capman	Oyj 2004 2012
Soneco	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2004 2012
Aidon	Oy Midinvest	management 2004 2013
Neoxen	Systems Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2004 2014
Pisla	Oy Midinvest	management 2004 2015
Plusdial	Ab Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2004 2016
Axel	Technologies	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2004 2016
Gammapro	Oy Midinvest	management 2005 2009
Codewise	Oy Midinvest	management 2005 2009
Viconsys	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2005 2010
Profimill	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2005 2010
Suomen	Teollisuusosa	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2005 2010
Tikli	Group	Oy Helmet	Capital 2005 2012
KitWorks.fi	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2005 2012
Nordic	Koivu	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2005 2015
Kenno	Tech	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2005 2016
ASAN	Security	Technologies	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2005 2016
suomen	terveystutkimus Korona	invest 2006 2006
SopValm	Oy Midinvest	management 2006 2008
Winestate	Oy Helmet	Capital 2006 2010
Kareline	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2006 2010
Mohinet	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2006 2010
Valimo	Wireless	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2006 2010
OneMed	Group Capman	Oyj 2006 2011
Lilli	Group	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2006 2011
coxa	 Korona	invest 2006 2011
Idesco Sentica 2006 2012
FinnSonic Sentica 2006 2013
Odoroff	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2006 2013
Aspida	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2006 2013
respecta Korona	invest 2006 2013
The	Switch	Engineering	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2006 2014
Endomines	AB Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2006 2015
Ekahau,	Inc. Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2006 2016
Vaadin	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2006 2016
Proactum	Oy Midinvest	management 2007 2009
Firecon	Oy Helmet	Capital 2007 2010
Tampulping	Oy Midinvest	management 2007 2011
Realia	Group	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2007 2011
Nidecon	Technologies	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2007 2011
hoitokoti	paivakumpu Korona	invest 2007 2011
Kaluste-Projektit	Oy Midinvest	management 2007 2013
Noleva	Group	Oy Capman	Oyj 2007 2013
Forchem MB	rahastot 2007 2013
Virtual	Air	Guitar	Company	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2007 2015
Nexstim	Oyj Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2007 2016
Farmos	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2008 2010
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Ahortech	Oy Midinvest	management 2008 2011
Lacell	Oy Midinvest	management 2008 2011
Corbel Sentica 2008 2011
Miratel Sentica 2008 2011
Scanclimber	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2008 2011
SafeGo	Oy Helmet	Capital 2008 2012
Mikeva Intera	Partners 2008 2012
Produal	Oy Midinvest	management 2008 2012
Nice	Entertainment	Oy Capman	Oyj 2008 2013
9Lives Sentica 2008 2013
Dewaco Sentica 2008 2013
9Lives	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2008 2013
Imbera	Electronics	Inc. Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2008 2013
vetrea Korona	invest 2008 2013
med	group Korona	invest 2008 2014
Consti	Yhtiöt Intera	Partners 2008 2015
Darekon Sentica 2008 2015
Polar	Spring	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2008 2015
Holiday	Club	Resorts	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2008 2015
Conformiq	Inc Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2008 2016
Eniram	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2008 2016
Renewa Vaaka	partners 2008 2016
Arme Sentica 2008 2017
jokilaakson	terveys Korona	invest 2009 2009
Confidex	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2009 2011
Biotie	Therapies	Oyj Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2009 2012
Academica	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2009 2012
European	Batteries	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2009 2013
Orthex Intera	Partners 2009 2015
Machinery	Group	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2009 2015
Pihlajalinna Sentica 2009 2016
Componenta	Oyj Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2009 2016
Pekkaniska	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2010 2011
Delete	Finland	Oy Intera	Partners 2010 2013
EMC	Talotekniikka	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2010 2013
avire	 Korona	invest 2010 2013
Incap	Oyj Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2010 2014
Musti	ja	Mirri Vaaka	partners 2010 2014
Glaston	Oyj	Abp Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2010 2015
Suominen	Oyj Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2010 2015
Mitron	Group	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2010 2015
Esperi	Care	Oy Capman	Oyj 2010 2016
Wise	Group	Finland	Oy Helmet	Capital 2010 2016
Arjessa Sentica 2010 2016
Beneq	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2010 2016
Finnprotein	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2011 2014
Puuilo Sentica 2011 2015
Panostaja	Oyj Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2011 2016
Kotipizza	Group Sentica 2011 2017
ThermiSol	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2011 2017
Animagi Intera	Partners 2012 2015
Produal Vaaka	partners 2012 2015
Soikea	Solutions	Oy Midinvest	management 2013 2016
Paytrail	Oyj Midinvest	management 2014 2015
Meyer	Turku	Oy Suomen	Teollisuussijoitus	Oy 2014 2015
Suomen	Lämpöikkuna	Oy Capman	Oyj 2014 2016
VBH-Invest	Ab Helmet	Capital 2015 2016
